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Abstract 
During the last decades, the number of ICT related patents has increased considerably. In association 
with a great fragmentation in IP rights, the increasing number of patents has generated a series of 
potentially problematic consequences. Patent thickets, royalty stacking, the emergence of patent 
assertion entities, increased patent litigation – in particular around standard essential patents – and 
the difficulties in the definition of fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing terms 
are among the most debated issues in the literature that we review in this paper. We devote a 
specific section of our survey to patents involving software products, where the above problems are 
amplified by the high level of abstraction of computer algorithms. In our analysis we mix theoretical 
and empirical arguments with a more policy-oriented reasoning. This allows us to better position the 
different issues in the relevant political and economic context. 
  
1. Introduction 
The dynamics of the knowledge economy in today’s globalized markets and the increasing 
complexity of products have radically modified firms’ intellectual property (IP) strategies and have 
led to an enormous growth in the number of patent applications. The proliferation of patents and 
their increasing fragmentation have produced a series of consequences – patent thickets, royalty 
stacking, augmented litigation, difficulties in the definition of licensing terms for patents related to 
standardized technologies... – that are seen as potentially problematic. In this paper, we survey the 
economic literature on the role of patents in information and communication technologies (ICTs) 
                                                             
1 This work is the continuation of a collaboration that took place within the EU research project EURIPIDIS –  
European Innovation Policies for the Digital Shift – (see Comino and Manenti, 2015). We thank Knut Blind for 
comments on an earlier version of this survey. 
2 Corresponding author. Address for correspondence: Department of Economics and Statistics, via Tomadini 
30/A, 33100 Udine (Italy), email: stefano.comino@uniud.it. 
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where much of the surge in patenting has taken place and where these changes in the IP landscape 
are most striking. 
ICTs – intended as the set of technologies aimed at processing, storing and transmitting information 
(including telecommunication equipment, consumer electronics, computers and software products) 
– are among the most dynamic and innovative segments of modern economies. They now permeate 
all aspects of our everyday life, impacting virtually all the sectors of the economy. ICTs are changing 
the way firms do business and are transforming the delivery of public services. Telecommunication 
networks are shaping the way social interactions take place, and the convergence of digital 
technologies is making it possible the so-called Internet of things, i.e. the increased connectedness 
of individuals and things on an unprecedented scale. In this extremely dynamic environment, it is 
crucial to understand how IP can be effectively used to stimulate and protect innovations. 
ICTs are highly heterogeneous and differ in nature and characteristics; however, they share some 
features which are relevant when evaluating the role of patents. They are complex technologies 
combining several different technological components. Innovation in ICTs is a highly cumulative 
process, with follow-on inventions often representing improvements or re-combinations of previous 
products or technologies. As we will discuss in this survey, these characteristics lead to 
fragmentation of IP rights and to the emergence of the so-called patent thickets. In this scenario, the 
role of patents in stimulating innovation and technology transfer is extremely controversial. 
Several actors and institutions – such as patent pools, standard setting organizations and patent 
intermediaries - have developed to cope with the increased technological complexity and to allow 
market players to “hack their way through the patent thicket” (Shapiro, 2001). However, as we 
document in detail, these institutions have generated a series of additional concerns. They typically 
require close collaboration among rival firms and for this reason they are often scrutinized by 
antitrust authorities. On top of this, as witnessed by the debate on FRAND licensing,  members of 
pools and standard setting organizations may have divergent interests and goals thus making it 
difficult for them to reach a consensual agreement on licensing schemes. The goal of intermediaries 
is to increase the efficiency of the market for patent related transactions. Among the various types 
of intermediaries, patent assertion entities (PAEs) have raised considerable public attention. They 
are alleged to be one of the major responsible for the surge in patent lawsuits; born as an high-tech 
phenomenon, PAEs are now broadening their scope of action towards other industrial sectors such 
as biotech and pharmaceuticals. 
A noticeable share in the increase in patenting can be ascribed to the software industry. Estimates 
reveal that about one third of the patents granted by the EPO and the USPTO are related to software 
products. Patents protecting software technologies are very controversial. As a matter of fact, the 
high degree of abstraction of software algorithms makes it difficult to assess their patentability and 
this raises concerns about the quality of the granted rights. A large share of the lawsuits in the 
recent “smartphone war” involved patents protecting software related technologies, a fact that is 
considered by many as a confirmation of the concerns regarding the low quality of software patents. 
Differences with the legal scope of patents for software technologies in the various jurisdictions and 
the heterogeneity in the examination rules at different patent offices have further contributed to 
the uncertainty in the field. The picture is made even more compelling due to the increasingly 
significant role of open source software. Based on the openness of the source code, this innovative 
way of creating and distributing computer programs needs to find its way to coexist with patented 
software. 
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This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we document the surge in patents and their changing 
role in ICTs, while Section 3 surveys the main theoretical contributions on the role of patenting in 
industries where innovation proceeds cumulatively. Section 4 presents the main problems 
associated with IP fragmentation and Sections 5 and 6 focus on patent pools and standard setting 
organizations, the traditional institutions aimed at copying with fragmentation. Section 7 discusses 
the literature on the market for ideas, focusing, in particular, on the role of intermediaries and PAEs. 
We devote Section 8 to software patents. Finally, Section 9 concludes. 
2. The surge in ICT patenting 
Patent applications increased steadily during the last decades. For the year 2014, WIPO (2016) 
estimates that the number of applications filed world-wide amounted to more than 2.4 million, a 
figure which is approximately three times that estimated in the 80s. About one third of these 
applications were filed within the ICT-related sectors. Similarly OECD (2014), looking at patents filed 
under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), finds that between 2009 and 2011 ICT patents were over 
38% of the total. A noteworthy trend is the increase in software patenting, as we document in 
Section 8.  
The surge in the number of patents seems to be at odds with what was found by Graham et al. 
(2010) in a survey on 1,332 US high-tech start-ups active in biotech, medical devices, software and IT 
hardware (semiconductors, communications and computer hardware). According to their evidence, 
for technology entrepreneurs the patent system seems neither working particularly poorly nor well 
for their companies and industries. Interestingly, software companies consider patents as the least 
important mechanism to appropriate the returns of their R&D efforts.3 The finding that innovators 
very often do not perceive patents as an effective instrument to protect their innovation is well-
known in the literature since the widely cited study by Cohen et al. (2000). These contrasting figures, 
surge in patenting and little effectiveness of patents as an appropriation mechanism, gave rise to 
what has been dubbed as the “patent paradox”. 
This paradox can be explained by considering the changing role that patents have in modern 
economies and in ICTs in particular. Hoeren et al. (2015) offer an interesting historical analysis of the 
evolution of IP protection in semiconductors. They show that since the early stages of the industry, 
manufacturers relied heavily on patents; however, firms used them essentially as an effective means 
of sharing technologies and rarely enforced them. Today, things have changed. In semiconductors, 
as well as in other industrial sectors with complex technologies, patents are often used as 
“bargaining chips” in order to improve the outcomes of licensing/cross-licensing negotiations (Hall 
and Ziedonis, 2001). The literature on strategic patenting is relatively abundant. On the hand, large 
patent portfolios have been considered as an important defensive safeguard against the possibility 
of rival firms taking legal actions for patent infringement (Ziedonis, 2004). On the other hand, 
patents can be used aggressively against competitors. This use of patents has become very relevant 
and for this reason it has attracted the attention of researchers. Walsh et al. (2016) and Torrisi et al. 
(2016) represent two of the most recent studies conducted on this issue. Walsh et al. (2016) use a 
random sample of 9,060 US triadic patents observed in the period 2000-2003 and investigate the 
                                                             
3 Patents are considered to be less effective than secrecy, first mover advantage, complementary assets, 
copyright and trademarks. 
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importance of preemption, that is, the use of patents to block competitors or to prevent them from 
inventing around. The authors find that compared to other technological areas, patents protecting 
computer and semiconductor technologies show high rates of preemptive use. Interestingly, they 
also find that the likelihood of using patents preemptively is positively associated with the strength 
of patent protection. A confirmation of the importance of strategic motives for patenting in ICTs is in 
Torrisi et al. (2016). They use survey data on inventors from 23 countries (European countries, Israel, 
the United States and Japan) filing applications at the EPO between 2003 and 2005. The authors 
show that a substantial share of patents is not being used by firms internally or for market 
transactions and they interpret this evidence as a support to the importance of strategic patenting. 
They also find significant differences across industrial sectors, with patents that are more likely to be 
employed strategically in complex technologies than in other areas.  
One of the sectors where patenting has increased the most during the recent years is software. 
Bessen and Hunt (2007) argue that the rise in software patents can only partially be explained with 
an increase in innovation and in research and development, while it is mainly related to strategic 
motives. They support this view by looking at the distribution by industry of software patents 
granted by the USPTO. It emerges that three out of four software patents do not belong to software 
publishers but to firms operating in some manufacturing industries (specifically, 28% in electronics 
and 24% in machinery); software publishers, in principle the companies mostly involved in the 
development of software programs, account for only 5% of the overall number of patents. By 
contrast, the share of programmers and engineers, i.e. those involved in the writing of software 
code, is much larger in software publishers and in non-manufacturing sectors. Only 11% of the 
overall programmers and 32% of the total number of programmers and engineers are employed in 
the manufacturing sector. These figures suggest that there is little correspondence between the 
R&D activity aimed at developing new software and patent ownership. At the same time, companies 
in manufacturing industries have greater propensity to amass large patent portfolios despite 
employing a small fraction of programmers. This evidence, according to Bessen and Hunt (2007), 
represents a clear signal of strategic patenting in software. 
On top of strategic uses, the empirical literature has shown that patents play also an important 
signaling role for start-ups and SMEs. A series of studies focus on ICTs and show that possessing a 
large stock of patents increases the chances of companies of being financed by venture capitalists 
(Cockburn and MacGarvie, 2009 and 2011) as well as it affects the amount the investment received 
(Mann and Sager, 2007).  
3. Patents and cumulative innovation 
In the theoretical literature, innovation is often described as a discrete event taking place once and 
for all, with no links to any past or future invention. Although useful in order to focus on the trade-
off between incentives to innovate and deadweight loss and to clarify the basic role of patents, the 
isolated innovation approach does not capture several critical features characterizing the inventive 
process in high-tech industries. The cumulativeness and complexity of innovation in ICTs make the 
role of patents less clear-cut provided that a strengthening of the protection they guarantee may 
have heterogeneous effects on the different generations of innovators. More generally, in order to 
understand the role of patents in ICT sectors one needs to consider additional effects, beyond the 
traditional trade-off highlighted in the isolated innovation framework. 
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With a cumulative innovation process, early inventions pave the way for follow-on innovators and 
technology implementers. The social value of early innovations is not only related to the utility 
generated from their use but also to the positive externality they contribute to future 
applications/developments – see Scotchmer, 2004 for a thorough discussion on the cumulative 
nature of the innovation process. At the same time, patent protection, while increasing the R&D 
incentives of early innovators, may discourage follow-on inventors and technology implementers 
from investing. By anticipating the licensing fees due to the owners of the relevant patents, or the 
cost of being involved in litigation, they may choose suboptimal levels of investment or may not 
invest at all. This is what is known in the literature as the hold-up problem in technology innovation 
(Lemley and Shapiro, 2007).4 Another potential inefficiency in the context of cumulative innovation 
is related to the so-called reverse hold-up, often referred to as hold-out problem. In this case, it is 
the follow-on inventor/implementer who, infringing on a patent, opportunistically refuses to enter 
into a licensing agreement with the inventor. While the empirical literature has highlighted instances 
where the hold-out emerges (Pentheroudakis and Baron, 2017), the theoretical contributions have 
mainly neglected this issue. 
With cumulative innovation, also the effect of imitation on R&D incentives should be reconsidered. 
Bessen and Maskin (2009) observe that imitation affects firm’s profitability in two ways. In the short-
run, imitators compete with the innovator, thus reducing the profits of this latter. However, in the 
longer run, the innovator may, in turn, imitate future inventions developed by competitors, 
therefore providing consumers with more innovative and technologically advanced products. This 
second, long-run, effect increases the incentives to innovate. Bessen and Maskin (2009) believe that 
in highly dynamic industries such as software, personal computers and semiconductors, the long-run 
effect dominates the short-run one and innovation may be fostered by the possibility of imitation. 
Therefore, in these industries innovation would flourish in the presence of lower levels of patent 
protection allowing some degree of imitation. 
The impact of patent rights on the overall innovation incentives and on the diffusion of the 
protected technologies is intimately related to the efficiency of negotiations among different 
generations of inventors/implementers. In one of the most influential contributions in this field, 
Green and Scotchmer (1995) show that the absence of failures in the bargaining over the licensing 
terms restores efficient incentives for the whole sequence of innovators. However, as we detail in 
the following sections, the literature has highlighted different reasons why negotiations may fail. 
Asymmetric information among contracting parties, the fragmentation of IP rights typical of ICT 
industries and the often alleged low quality of granted patents severely hamper the efficiency of 
licensing negotiations.  
As regards the effects of low quality patents the contribution of Farrell and Shapiro (2008) deserves 
to be mentioned. They show that low-quality patents (what the authors call “weak” patents) may 
generate two forms of inefficiencies. On the one hand, there is a free-riding effect reducing the 
incentives to go to Court looking for invalidation; all follow-on innovators benefit from patent 
invalidation, but the cost of filing a lawsuit is borne only by the plaintiff. On the other hand, patents, 
                                                             
4 It is interesting to notice that, in the theoretical literature, the terms follow-on inventors and implementers 
are often used interchangeably and the distiction between these two figures is rather blurred. 
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even the low quality ones, allow patent holders to set fees strategically in the attempt to reduce 
competition among implementers, thus maximizing licensing revenues.  
While the theoretical literature on the effects of patents on cumulative innovation is quite 
abundant, the empirical evidence is relatively scant. This is not surprising given the difficulties both 
in measuring cumulativeness and in identifying the causal effect of patents on innovation. Galasso 
and Schankerman (2015) represent a notable exception. They study the impact on follow-on 
research of the removal of patent rights by court invalidation in the US. The authors measure follow-
on innovation using later citations and solve the identification problem thanks to the fact that the US 
Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit institutionally allocates judges to patent cases randomly; this 
allows the authors to control for the potential endogeneity of patent invalidation. According to their 
estimates, Galasso and Schankerman (2015) find that patents hinder follow-on innovation in 
computers, electronics, and medical instruments; by contrast no effects are found in drugs, 
chemicals, and mechanical technologies. Interestingly, they provide evidence of invalidation 
stimulating subsequent innovation only in relation to patents owned by large companies. 
4. Fragmentation of patent rights 
In ICT industrial sectors, a series of factors – the cumulativeness of the innovation process, the 
complexity of technologies, and the increasing patenting volumes – has “naturally” led to a high 
degree of fragmentation of patent rights and to the emergence of the so-called patent thickets. 
Often the various components essential for the functioning of a technological system are controlled 
by a large and dispersed number of operators; this fragmentation in property rights potentially 
constraints the ability to operate and forces companies to secure the necessary licenses in order “to 
hack their way through the patent thicket” (Shapiro, 2001). The prevalence of 
fragmentation/thickets in ICT-related sectors is confirmed in Hall et al., (2013) and Graevenitz et al. 
(2013). The authors identify thickets by counting “triples” i.e. groups of three firms in which each of 
them is in a mutually blocking relationship with the other two due to the patents they own. Using 
information on patent applications filed at the EPO, Hall et al., (2013) find a high number of thickets 
in all areas belonging to Electrical Engineering, especially in Telecommunications, Audiovisual 
Technology, and Computer Technology. Interestingly, they also find that some large ICT companies 
are responsible for a relevant share of thickets in other technological fields (e.g. Instruments).  
For easiness of exposition, in what follows, we group the main contributions in the literature 
regarding the consequences of fragmentation and patent thickets into three areas. 
Fragmentation and royalty stacking/anticommons 
The economic literature suggests that patent thickets may lead to multiple marginalizations and 
royalty stacking (Shapiro, 2001); hence, fragmentation potentially amplifies the distortions 
associated with upstream monopolists. In an often cited theoretical study on biomedical research, 
Heller and Eisenberg (1998) warn against what they call “the tragedy of the anti-commons”. With 
highly dispersed patent rights reading on a single technology, implementers are forced to negotiate 
a large number of licensing agreements and this fact may reduce their incentives to use the 
technology altogether. Lichtman (2006) holds a quite different view. A high degree of fragmentation 
implies that each patent grants control over a limited part of the technology. This fact reduces the 
bargaining power of patent holders who, in turn, negotiate licensing agreements less and less 
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aggressively. The overall effect of fragmentation, according to Lichtman, is to facilitate licensing 
negotiations, thus favoring access to the technology. Galasso and Schankerman (2010) present a 
theoretical model incorporating the views both of Heller and Eisenberg as well as that of Lichtman. 
As fragmentation rises two contrasting effects emerge. On the one hand, the negotiation process 
becomes more complex provided that the number of agreements to be signed gets larger. On the 
other hand, however, since the value of each patent reduces with fragmentation, negotiations about 
each licensing agreement speed up. Whether fragmentation discourages (royalty 
stacking/anticommons view) or favors (Lichtman’s view) technology implementation depends on 
which effect dominates. By using data on patent disputes in U.S. district courts, Galasso and 
Schankerman (2010) test their model by estimating how fragmentation affects the length of 
licensing negotiations. The authors find weak evidence that fragmentation accelerates the 
negotiation process; this moderately supports Lichtman’s argument. 
Patent pendency and patent quality 
The surge in patenting and the associated fragmentation of IP rights have increased the backlog of 
patent offices. An undesirable consequence of large backlogs is that they increase the pendency 
periods, i.e. the time between the filing of a patent application and the granting decision by the 
patent office. Pendency is costly for applicants as it delays the time from which they can benefit 
from their innovations being fully protected; long pendency rates are costly for non-applicants too, 
as they increase uncertainty over the technology they can freely use (IPO, 2013).5 Large patenting 
volumes may also affect the quality of patents intended as the ability of a patent to “meet the 
statutory patentability requirements”, to “leave little doubt as to its breadth”, and “to disclose 
information that enables a person skilled in the art to implement the protected invention” (EPO, 
2012a). Under the pressure of ever increasing backlogs, examiners necessarily devote less and less 
time in screening applications. This issue seems to be particularly severe in the U.S.; in an influential 
book, Jaffe and Lerner (2004) argue that the USPTO has been issuing a significant number of low 
quality patents.6 de Rassenfosse et al. (2016) evaluate the quality of patents by comparing the 
decisions of different PTOs regarding the protection of the same innovation. They estimate that 
about 2-6% of granted patents are of dubious validity, i.e. they appear to be inconsistent with the 
Office’s own standards and, therefore, potentially invalid.7 Interestingly, the authors find that the 
                                                             
5It deserves to be noticed that according to industry experts pendency may have the positive effect of 
providing patent applicants with strategic options to explore the market before the final scope of protection is 
fixed. This is particularly important in highly competitive fields like ICT. 
6 The issue of patent quality appears to be less relevant as regards EPO (Wild and Clover, 2015). No patent 
office grants patents of perfect quality as EPO opposition figures illustrate. EPO (2015) estimates that in 2014 
some 4.5% of European patents were attacked by an opposition with the EPO board of appeal. Some 31% of 
these opposition cases led to the revocation of the patent and in another 38% of these cases the patent had to 
be limited in scope. 
7More specifically, de Rassenfosse et al. (2016) distinguish two conceptually distinct reasons why low quality 
patents may be granted: i) Patent offices systematically apply too lenient standards for patentability; ii) the 
examination process is superficial so that undeserved (i.e. patents inconsistent with the patent offices' own 
standards) and potentially invalid patents are granted. In both cases, patent protection is not worth to be 
granted. In their empirical analysis, based on a sample of more than 400 thousand applications filed at 
different patent offices, the authors find that on top of the 2-6% patents of dubious validity, another 2-15% is 
estimated to be of low quality in the sense that they would not have been granted were the (stricter) 
standards of some other patent offices being applied. 
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share of patents of dubious validity is higher in frontier industries such as software and 
biotechnology.  
Fragmentation and innovation incentives 
From a theoretical perspective, the consequences of patent fragmentation on the incentives to 
innovate are not easy to predict, as they likely depend on firm and market characteristics. On the 
one hand, firms that rely heavily on the technology developed by others – mainly new entrants or 
SMEs – may have reduced incentives to invest in R&D as they fear to be held-up by competitors. In 
addition, companies may be forced to devote substantial parts of their budgets in the attempt to 
build large patent portfolios aimed at improving their bargaining position when negotiating cross-
licensing agreements. On the other hand, fragmentation may encourage innovation of technology 
leaders – mainly large incumbents and companies holding sizeable patent portfolios – who can 
leverage the mass of patents they possess.8 The empirical literature on patent fragmentation is 
relatively scarce mainly due to the lack of suitable data. Nevertheless, the available contributions 
confirm that the consequences of thickets are differentiated and depend on company characteristics 
and market specificities. Graevenitz et al. (2013) focus on the patenting behaviour of 2,074 firms 
filing applications at the EPO between 1978 and 2003. Their analysis confirms that for complex 
technologies like telecommunications, large and small firms react to patent fragmentation 
differently; while firms holding large portfolios patent more intensively as thicket density increases, 
holders of fewer patents reduce their applications in response to larger and denser thickets. Hall et 
al. (2013) look at how thickets influence firms’ entry, defined as the decision to patent for the first 
time in a given technology area. They employ a sample of about 29 thousand UK SMEs observed 
over the period 2002-09. Using duration regression analysis, they find that the propensity to patent 
for the first time in a given technology area is negatively affected by thickets density; again, this 
evidence confirms that small firms are the ones that are eventually most harmed by thickets. 
Cockburn et al. (2010) find that fragmentation has a differentiated impact on companies depending 
on whether they need to in-license the technology they use. The authors measure firms’ innovative 
activity in terms of the share of sales from new products. They find a negative relationship between 
fragmentation and their proxy for innovation in the case of firms needing to license the technology 
from rivals. By contrast, companies that do not in-license increase their share of sales from new 
products the greater the fragmentation.  
5. Patent pools 
Historically, the two ways that market participants have employed to cope with IP fragmentation are 
patent pools and standard setting organisations (SSOs). Patent pools can be defined as “an 
agreement between two or more patent owners to license one or more of their patents to one 
another or to third parties” (WIPO, 2014). Pools represent a one-stop-shop through which an 
implementer can access the package of patents belonging to several owners and reading on the 
relevant technology. Therefore, they significantly reduce the transaction costs associated with 
                                                             
8In a 2012 workshop on patents thickets, experts (practitioners, policy makers and academics) agreed that 
patent thickets are a consequence of technological complexity and high competition and as such are more 
likely to harm SMEs and individual inventors; these are less able to cope with the “cost of complexity”, namely 
the costs associated with: the uncertainty over freedom to operate, the lack of transparency, the search of 
relevant prior art and legal actions (EPO, 2012b). 
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thickets and are seen as a potential solution to inefficiencies resulting from fragmented and 
overlapping patents. 
Patent pools require close collaboration among member firms. As these companies are often rivals 
in the product market, much of the economic analysis has looked at pools from a competition policy 
perspective; as a matter of fact, an increasing number of antitrust cases deal with patent pooling 
arrangements (Gilbert, 2004). In this respect, two interrelated issues are relevant in order to 
evaluate the effects of patent pools. The first one, relates to the degree of substitutability or 
complementarity of patents forming the pool; the second one regards the possibility of independent 
licensing. 
A well-established result in the theoretical literature is that patent pools are anti-competitive when 
they include patents that are perfect substitutes while they increase market efficiency in the case of 
perfect complements (Shapiro, 2001; Lerner and Tirole, 2004). When patents are perfect substitutes, 
the pool eliminates competition on royalties among holders of patents addressing exactly the same 
functionalities; therefore, in this case, the members of the pool benefit from reduced competition to 
the detriment of market efficiency, as in a standard cartel. By contrast, when technologies are 
perfect complements, pools are pro-competitive as members internalize that larger royalties reduce 
the demand for complementary patents and, consequently, they are induced to lower licensing fees. 
In other words, with perfect complements, patent pools mitigate royalty stacking. 
Lerner and Tirole (2008) highlight that these arguments apply neatly but only in the extreme cases of 
perfect substitutes/complements. In the intermediate cases of imperfect complementarity or 
substitutability of patents, the consequences of pools are more nuanced. The authors show that the 
desirability of patent pools depends on a series of conditions such as the ability of prospective 
licensors to invent around, their capacity to invalidate patents or the possibility of pool members to 
grant individual licenses. The role of individual licensing on pools efficiency has been investigated 
more in detail in Lerner and Tirole (2004). The two authors show when the pool is aimed at 
increasing royalties (as in the case of substitutes patents) independent licensing restores 
competition among pool members and therefore it is welfare enhancing; on the opposite, with 
complementary patents, competition in royalties does not produce any effect. Lerner and Tirole’s 
arguments support the approach followed by competition authorities that often impose 
independent licensing to pool members; the authors, in fact, suggest that independent licensing 
reduces profitability of “bad” pools, i.e. pools aimed at increasing royalties. 
Another issue that has been extensively studied in the literature regards the effects of the so-called 
grant-back clauses. A grant-back clause requires pool members to disclose and transfer all 
improvements made in the licensed technology for free or at a low price. Such a requirement 
generates a trade-off between lower incentives to innovate and lower risk of hold-up. With grant 
back clauses, firms may be discouraged from innovating as they anticipate lower returns from the 
licensing of future patents. However, grant-back clauses protect from members’ opportunism; for 
example, they prevent companies from hiding essential innovations in an attempt to hold-up other 
members once the pool has formed (Lerner and Tirole, 2008). 
The empirical evidence on the effects of patent pools on firms’ innovative activities in ICTs is mixed. 
Joshi and Nerkar (2011) analyze data on innovation in the global optical disc industry and find that 
patent pools have significantly decreased both the quantity and the quality of patents obtained by 
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pool members. Based on this evidence, the authors suggest that pools seem actually to inhibit, 
rather than stimulate, innovation. Vakili (2012) investigates the impact of the MPEG-2 pool focusing 
on the innovation rate of outsider firms that are technologically proximate to the pool. Also this 
study finds a negative effect of the pool, with outsider firms innovating less after the pool formation. 
However, by looking at the underlying mechanisms driving this result, Vakili (2012) shows that the 
observed reduction in innovation rates is mainly due to a shift in firms’ strategy: investments in 
technological exploration seems to have been replaced by greater efforts in implementing the 
MPEG-2 technology in their own products. These negative effects of pools on innovation incentives 
are questioned by Baron and Pohlmann (2015). According to the two authors, in order to better 
understand the consequences for innovation one should also take into account the dynamics of 
patenting before the actual formation of the pool. More specifically, Baron and Pohlmann (2015) 
collect information on 50 patent pools in ICT industries; some of these pools were announced but 
then failed to take-off while others were also actually implemented. The authors find a significant 
increase in patenting just after the announcement of the pool; the effect is stronger for pools that 
were not only announced but that, later on, were also actually formed. Prospective members of the 
pool contributed the most to the increase in patenting in this pre-formation period. Based on these 
findings, the authors suggest that the decline in innovation activities found in previous articles on 
patent pools should be interpreted cautiously, as one should also look at the dynamics just before 
the advent of the pool. 
6. Standard setting organizations and FRAND licensing 
Together with pools, Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) are the other traditional institutional 
arrangement useful to cope with the inefficiencies related to fragmentation. Standards are 
ubiquitous in ICT industries due to the strong need for interoperability. Typically, SSOs are formed by 
industry stakeholders who endorse a particular technology and promote its adoption among market 
participants (Simcoe, 2011). Standards aim at facilitating the deployment of new technologies on the 
largest possible scale and create a level playing field for competition in related product markets. 
Standardized technologies include a large number of patented inventions; the prospect of licensing 
patents that are essential to standards – the so-called standard-essential patents (SEPs) –  on an 
industry-wide scale is a major incentive for companies to invest in standardization activities. Most 
SSOs have defined intellectual property rights policies whereby members commit to licensing their 
SEPs on “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” (FRAND) terms (Meniere, 2015). 
The debate on FRAND licensing 
As discussed in Meniere (2015), until the 1990s, when SSOs started adopting FRAND policies, 
licensing negotiations took place among few companies with quite aligned interests, all involved 
both in the development and in the implementation of the standard. These vertically integrated 
companies typically ended-up cross-licensing their SEPs, thus paying little royalties to each other. By 
contrast, today the rapid evolution of information and communication technologies, coupled with 
the need for wider and deeper interconnectivity, has led to a variety of SEP owners and 
implementers with different business models and to a greater diversity of licensing practices. As a 
result, it has become more difficult to identify a consensual interpretation of FRAND licensing 
principles. It is often argued that FRAND commitments are too loose to effectively prevent SEP 
owners from unduly leveraging market power once the standard is implemented (“hold-up” 
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argument). Others argue that FRAND commitments enable technology implementers to deliberately 
avoid seeking licenses for SEPs (“hold-out” argument). Moreover, the fragmentation of SEP 
ownership might lead to an excessively high royalty stack (“royalty stacking” argument) (Baron et al., 
2016a). 
The theoretical literature on FRAND licensing has mainly focused on the hold-up problem and on the 
exact meaning of “reasonable” royalty rates. The basic argument suggesting the risk of hold-up is 
quite simple and rests on the idea that, once a standard is defined, the industry is “locked-in” and 
SEP owners gain monopolistic positions; as a matter of fact, before the standard is defined several 
technologies compete to be included in the standard while, once the standard has been developed 
and adopted, implementers are forced to use the, by then essential, technologies. The distinction 
between the ex-ante and the ex-post values of the technologies is at the heart of Swanson and 
Baumol’s (2005) influential paper. The two authors suggest that a SEP should be remunerated 
according to its “incremental value”, that is the valuation that would emerge in an auction or other 
forms of bargaining among substitute technologies prior (ex-ante) to the definition of the standard. 
Though theoretically elegant, this proposal faces some practical problems; first of all, the royalty 
rates are actually set ex-post, when the standard is at the commercialization stage. If this is the case, 
it might be difficult to have a full understanding of the competing technologies that were available 
at the time of the definition of the standard. For this reason an SSO’s best practice would be to keep 
track of the ex-ante feasible technologies in order to inform subsequent negotiators and arbitrators 
of the technical alternatives (Lemley and Shapiro, 2013). Another difficulty in implementing the 
incremental value criterion rests on the fact that typical licensing negotiations involve several SEPs 
and this makes the determination of the value of each patent an extremely complicated matter 
(Gupta, 2013). An even more serious shortcoming of the incremental value criterion is highlighted in 
Layne-Farrar and Llobet (2014); when, ex-ante, the difference between competing technologies is 
one-dimensional (e.g. they are identical but differ only in production costs), the incremental value 
can be determined rather easily. However, as technologies are of interest of many users with 
different needs and preferences, there is not a unique incremental value which, instead, is user-
specific. 
One issue that has attracted the attention of researchers regards the practical implementation of 
FRAND licensing. Typically, FRAND provisions do not impose specific obligations for the 
determination of SEPs licensing terms; rather, they define a general framework and leave the 
identification of the exact conditions to negotiations between patent holders and implementers. If, 
on the one side, this flexibility allows parties to tailor the agreements to their specificities, on the 
other side it comes at the cost of a lack of transparency and of a larger degree of uncertainty 
(Meniere, 2015). Practitioners and industry experts argue in favor of this flexibility, but they also 
recognize that some limitations might help in reducing uncertainty and the associated transaction 
costs. Meniere (2015) lists a set of possible interventions, including the disclosure of information on 
SEP licensing conditions; knowing the terms of previous agreements may help current negotiators in 
defining a benchmark for the determination of reasonable rates. 
Moving from the observation that FRAND commitments are ambiguous, Lerner and Tirole (2015) 
build a theoretical framework that highlights the main trade-offs arising in the determination of the 
licensing terms of standard essential patents. They suggest to impose patent holders a commitment 
to a maximum royalty before the definition of the standard. In a manner which is reminiscent of 
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Swanson and Baumol (2005) arguments, ex-ante competition in royalty caps among technologies 
willing to be included in the standard would be a way to restore efficiency. In principle, the 
commitment to royalty caps proposed by Lerner and Tirole (2015) would made FRAND provisions 
redundant; nonetheless, the inability of SSOs to identify all the relevant technologies limits the 
efficacy of royalty caps and calls for the adoption of FRAND commitments anyway. In the view of the 
authors, therefore, royalty caps and FRAND commitments would complement each other. 
A different issue that has attracted the attention of the economic literature on SSOs regards the 
quality of SEPs; the discussion has been fuelled by the recent “smartphone war” –  discussed later in 
the survey –  which is seen by many as caused by the presence of essential patents of low quality. 
Regibeau et al. (2016) suggest to impose a significant declaration fee for SEPs and regular 
essentiality tests of a random sample of SEPs. Testing essentiality of SEPs would raise their quality 
and could considerably contribute to reduce transaction costs. It is not clear, however, who should 
carry out these tests, what the costs would be and who would bear them. Analyzing the case of ETSI, 
the European Telecommunications standards Institute, Pohlmann and Blind (2016) suggest that SEPs 
tests might be carried out by the European Patent Office. Rysman and Simcoe (2008) provide 
different evidence on the quality of SEPs. They use information collected from the publicly available 
IPR disclosure archives of four major SSOs (ANSI, IEEE, IETF and the ITU) between 1971 and 2006, 
and find that, prior to disclosure, patents reading on standards receive roughly double the citation 
rate of an average patent. They interpret this finding as evidence of a high quality of SEPs, with SSOs 
performing well in selecting technologies with higher inherent merit. 
The role of courts in FRAND licensing 
A related matter of contention regards the role of courts in case licensing negotiations fail. In the US, 
courts play an active role in the determination of the licensing terms; reasonable royalties are 
determined on the basis of a “hypothetical” negotiation that would have taken place between the 
parties before the infringement. As stressed in Pentheroudakis and Baron (2017), US courts are 
methodologically sophisticated,9 even though their approach based on a hypothetical negotiation 
appears to be quite difficult to be implemented in practice. European courts are, instead, more 
focused on the conduct of parties during negotiations and they specifically assess whether patent 
holders have complied with the obligations imposed by FRAND commitments. Some differences 
between the two sides of the Atlantic emerge also in relation to the imposition of injunctions. 
Traditionally, US courts have been reluctant to grant injunctive reliefs to SEP owners committed to 
FRAND licensing. In contrast, European courts tended to be more prone to concede injunctions; 
things have changed since the 2015 decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Huawei 
vs ZTE (Baron et al., 2016b). The ruling restrains the possibility of seeking injunctive relief by 
specifying a set of requirements that must be fulfilled by the SEP owner. Specifically, before seeking 
                                                             
9In a landmark decision in 1970 - Georgia-Pacific Corp. vs United States Plywood Corp - Judge Tenney 
established 15 factors to be considered for the determination of reasonable royalties; these are known as the 
Georgia Pacific factors. The pioneer case for FRAND in the U.S. is Microsoft Corp. vs Motorola, Inc. in 2012. The 
court established that royalty rates should be determined as the outcome of a hypothetical bilateral 
negotiation ex ante to standard setting.  
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an injunction the patent holder must inform the implementer about the infringement and must 
present a detailed offer indicating the royalty rate and the way in which it has been determined. 
SSOs and innovation 
The literature has devoted far less attention to the relationship between SSOs membership and 
firms innovative activities. As suggested by Baron et al. (2014), despite the fact that SSOs are 
intended as an institution to speed up the standardization process and, as such, to improve market 
efficiency, they may have undesired effects on the incentives to innovate of their members. Often 
companies contributing to the standard adhere to informal consortia to supplement the formal 
standard setting process; the three authors study how these consortia can help coordinating R&D 
efforts thus mitigating market failures. Using information on a large panel of ICT standards issued 
between 1992 and 2009, they find that firms tend to innovate more after joining the consortium. 
However, this effect disappears, or it is even reversed, when the firms R&D incentives are mainly 
driven by the prospect of licensing a standard essential patent. Blind et al. (2017) study the interplay 
of standards and governmental regulation on firms’ innovative efficiency, measured in terms of the 
resources needed to innovate. The authors use information collected within the 2011 German 
Community Innovation Survey and find that regulation and standards have opposing effects which 
depend on the degree of uncertainty characterizing the environment within which companies 
operate. They distinguish markets with low or high degree of uncertainty on the basis of an index 
combining different sources of uncertainty (competition, consumer behavior, technological 
complexity). The authors find that, in the case of low market uncertainty, standards reduce 
innovation efficiency while regulation increases it; with high market uncertainty, results are 
reversed. 
7. The market for ideas 
One of the crucial roles of patents is to favour the market for ideas, that is a place where the right to 
use a technology is traded, either via licensing or via outright sale. As already mentioned (see 
Section 3), Green and Scotchmer (1995) show that an efficient patent market guarantees the correct 
R&D incentives for the whole sequence of innovators. It is difficult to estimate accurately the overall 
magnitude of the market for ideas as most transactions are confidential. Nevertheless, available 
evidence suggests that it has grown considerably during the last years (see Arora and Gambardella, 
2010 for a survey). Recent figures reveal that cross-country licensing for patents, trademarks and 
copyright, including transactions among affiliated entities, increased in the OECD area by an average 
annual rate of 10.6% between 2000 and 2010 (OECD, 2012). Athreye and Yang (2011), updating a 
previous work by Athreye and Cantwell (2007), show that overall license and royalty payments 
reached approximately USD 180 billion in 2009. In a survey with a sample of more than 2,000 
European and Japanese firms, Zuniga and Guellec (2008) find that about a fifth of European 
companies and a fourth of the Japanese ones license patents to non-affiliated firms. The two authors 
also observe that, between 2003 and 2006, licensing has increased in importance for about 45% of 
the firms in the sample. Akcigit et al. (2015) measure the extent of the patent market by focusing on 
outright sales. They estimate firm-by-firm transfers using information from the NBER-USPTO patent 
grant database and from the patent reassignment data hosted in Google Patents Beta. They find 
that, among the patents registered at the USPTO during the period 1976-2006, 16% were traded; 
this number goes up to 20% among domestic patents. Looking at the sectorial level, ICT firms appear 
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to be involved in technology licensing much more than companies in other sectors (Sheehan et al., 
2004). Interestingly, according to Hagiu et al. (2011) individual inventors and SMEs seem to be the 
least able to access patent markets. By combining information taken from several different public 
sources, the authors find that, indeed, in the United States, large companies contribute about to 
40% of all patents but obtain 99% of the revenues generated through licensing. Therefore, it seems 
that market distortions reduce the ability of small firms and inventors to monetize the value of their 
patents. 
Despite the impressive growth registered during the recent years, the market for ideas appears to be 
prone to failures. Drawing from the literature on market design, Gans and Stern (2010) identify 
several potential inefficiencies characterizing the patent market. First of all, patents are inherently 
difficult to evaluate; parties may have disparate expectations about their value and little information 
can be drawn from previous market transactions. Moreover, with highly fragmented IP rights, as in 
ICTs, the acquisition of a single patent is of little value, unless prospective buyers already own 
complementary patents. These complementarity/portfolio effects reduce the number of potential 
buyers, thus making the market less “thick”. In addition to that, the cost of searching and identifying 
potential buyers or sellers of the technology is substantial; this is all the more so as the number of 
patents reading on the relevant technologies/products gets larger. Finally, negotiations take place in 
the shadow of litigation and licensing terms heavily depend on the opportunity cost of going to trial 
for the involved parties rather than on the actual value of the patent. As a consequence of these 
inefficiencies, it is frequently mentioned that potentially valuable patents might not be 
commercialized and fully exploited for innovation (Giuri et al., 2015). 
Moving from these considerations, Agrawal et al. (2015) employ licensing data from the 2006 survey 
conducted by the Licensing Foundation in the US and Canada to estimate the main reasons of deal 
failures in the market for ideas. They identify three stages in the licensing process, the initial stage of 
identification of the prospective buyers/sellers, the intermediate stage where negotiations occur 
and the last stage where the agreement is reached. The authors find that significant failures occur 
especially in the first stage where the lack of market thickness prevents identifying potential 
buyers/sellers, and in the last stage because of the classical Arrow’s appropriability problem which 
makes sellers hesitating in providing full information about the technology (Arrow, 1962). 
Frictions at the initial stages of the licensing process associated with large search costs and pervasive 
information asymmetries are found to play a major role also in Gambardella et al. (2007).10 The lack 
of transparency regarding patent transactions has been recognized by industry experts and analysts 
as one of the major impediments to the development of the market for ideas. As a matter of fact, 
when intellectual property changes hands, there is often no record of the transaction; this generates 
uncertainty over who is in the market, what their intentions are, and whether their property rights 
are already licensed. This lack of transparency leads potentially to more infringements, higher 
transaction costs, and larger expenses for dispute resolution (Giuri et al., 2015). This issue is so 
relevant that the USPTO has recently made available on Google Patents information on 
reassignments; these data inform about changes in patent ownership since the year 1980 (see 
                                                             
10Comino et al. (2011) develop a game-theoretic model to show that even in the presence of a “weak” form of 
asymmetric information - the inability of the early inventor to observe the timing of the investment of the 
follow-on inventor – innovators are prevented from negotiating efficiently.  
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Akcigit et al., 2015). The market itself is coming up with new models, like the recently initiated 
Avanci.com platform for the licensing of wireless technologies, aimed at allowing developers and 
implementers to disentangle what technology rights they need and how to get them. It will be 
interesting from a research perspective to analyze how these new business models will impact on 
patent markets in the future. 
Patent intermediaries 
In principle, intermediaries may play a crucial role in curbing the inefficiencies characterizing patent 
markets. However, Hagiu and Yoffie (2013) argue that “traditional intermediaries” such as brokers, 
patent pools and standard setting organizations play a limited role in mitigating market distortions. 
Brokers facilitate the sale or the licensing of patents but tend to focus on high-end transactions only. 
Patent pools, instead, emerge under very specific conditions. They arise in the presence of multiple 
marginalizations/royalty stacking problems, substantially limiting the scope for technology licensing. 
Also more recent forms of intermediaries (patent auctions and “ebay-like” online patent 
marketplaces) are unlikely to represent a real fix to inefficiencies either because they fail to increase 
market thickness or because they are inherently unable to address the classical Arrow’s 
appropriability problem.  
According to Hagiu and Yoffie (2013), a more promising type of intermediaries are patent 
aggregators. The two authors distinguish between defensive aggregators and super-aggregators. 
Defensive aggregators offer their clients a sort of “insurance” against the risk of been sued for 
infringement. More specifically, defensive aggregators identify and purchase patents that might 
threaten their clients (who, in turn, pay annual subscription fees to the aggregator or contribute 
directly to the purchase). These patents are then licensed by the aggregator to its clients for use in 
legal suits. Super-aggregators act both defensively, by licensing the acquired patents to their 
clients/investors, and also aggressively by suing third parties in search for licensing revenues. In this 
latter respect, super-aggregators are considered as a form of patent assertion entity which we will 
discuss below. Probably, the most well-known super-aggregator is Intellectual Ventures which, by 
holding approximately 40,000 patents concentrated in ICT sectors, represents one of the largest 
patent portfolios world-wide. Intellectual Ventures has raised large investments from prominent 
technology companies such as Amazon, Apple, eBay, Google, Intel, Microsoft, Sony, Samsung, etc.. 
Patent assertion entities (PAEs) 
Patent assertion entities (PAEs) represent one of the most controversial phenomena related to the 
market for ideas. PAEs are generally referred to as entities acquiring patents from third parties and 
exploiting them in order to maximize earnings from licensing and litigation (see Schwartz and Kesan, 
2014 and Cohen et al., 2014). Typically, PAEs do not rely on manufacturing or selling products; 
sometimes, they offer their clients ancillary services such as IP consulting or assistance for the 
development of patent portfolios. One of the reasons why PAEs are so controversial is that they are 
considered to be one of the major responsible for the surge in patent litigation. For instance, Chien 
(2013) estimates that, in the year 2012, nearly two-thirds of patent lawsuits in the US were initiated 
by a PAE (about 2,900 out of 4,700 of the cases), with a marked increase with respect to the 
previous years. In Europe, PAEs appear to be a less pervasive phenomenon; according to Love et al. 
(2017), in the UK (years 2000-13) and in Germany (years 2000-08) patent assertion entities were 
responsible for about 10% of the patent lawsuits. As a matter of fact, the legal fragmentation of 
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patent protection under the existing European patent system disincentivizes PAEs from carrying out 
assertion activity on a pan-European scale. On top of this, the “loser pays” rule  adopted in the EU 
legislations for  the  allotment of  legal expenses further discourages PAEs from initiating legal 
disputes. 
The increased importance of PAEs has stimulated an intense debate concerning the potential impact 
of their activities. On the one hand, PAEs are supposed to increase market thickness thus improving 
efficiency. They are also expected to mitigate the so-called “hold-out problem” i.e. the opportunistic 
behavior of large companies that consciously infringe SMEs IPRs without paying any licensing fees. In 
this view, small innovative companies may rely on PAEs as a counter-balancing instrument against 
powerful infringers (Chien, 2013 and Pohlmann and Opitz, 2013). On the other hand, opponents of 
PAEs argue that these companies exploit the imperfections of the legal system and the main 
consequence of their activities is to raise the cost of innovation. 
Two recent reports by the Federal Trade Commission and the Joint Research Center of the European 
Commission provide an overview of PAEs activities in the US and in Europe, respectively (FTC, 2016 
and JRC, 2016). PAEs appear to be a very heterogeneous phenomenon with respect to several 
dimensions such as funding, strategies, and services offered to their clients. FTC (2016) distinguishes 
between “Portfolio” and “Litigation” PAEs depending on their business model. The former tend to be 
strongly capitalized and to purchase patents outright. They negotiate high-stake licensing deals 
(worth in the millions of dollars) covering large patent portfolios. Litigation PAEs, instead, typically 
sue potential licensees looking for a quick settlement afterwards. The FTC study reveals that despite 
being the predominant form of patent assertion entity (they account for 96% of the examined 
cases), Litigation PAEs generate only 20% of the reported licensing revenues. Interestingly, the 
licenses negotiated by Litigation PAEs seem not to reflect the actual value of the patents; on average 
each deal amounts to less than $300,000, a figure which closely approximates the lower bound of 
litigation costs (FTC, 2016). This corroborates the hypothesis of this form of PAEs being mainly 
involved into nuisance litigation. ICT sectors are the most impacted by both in Europe and in the US, 
though recent evidence reveals that PAEs are now moving in other sectors, such as pharmaceutical 
and biotech (Feldman and Nicholson Price, 2013). According to FTC (2016), nearly nine out of ten of 
the patents controlled by PAEs are high-tech. In Europe, PAEs acquired the vast majority of their 
patents from large handset manufacturers: the development of new technologies/products, such as 
smartphones, put incumbent manufacturers under pressure and, as a reaction to their declining 
businesses, they started selling their patent portfolios to PAEs (JRC, 2016). Not surprisingly, ICT 
industries are the most affected also in terms of asserted patents (on this point, see also Haus and 
Juranek, 2014 and Helmers et al., 2014); for instance, in Europe, alleged infringements frequently 
involve standard essential patents. Both the FTC and JRC reports cannot confirm a large scale impact 
of PAEs’ activity on consumers; overall their welfare effect is mainly determined by the quality of the 
asserted patents (JRC, 2016). Patents of generally higher quality in Europe are one reason for the 
lower amount of PAEs activity and less litigation in Europe compared to the US. A radically new legal 
framework is expected to be introduced in Europe with the implementation of the unitary patent 
system and the unified patent court (IPO, 2014). Under the new legislation, a unitary patent granted 
by the EPO, will provide uniform protection all across Europe. The unified patent court, in turn, will 
be responsible for rulings in disputes regarding unitary patents. It is unclear at this moment as to 
how far the upcoming regime will provide more or less business opportunities for PAEs. It is 
recognized that the alleged advantages of the new European system – e.g. the reduction in 
patenting costs – may favour PAEs’ activities; however, much will depend on the continuation of 
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delivery of high quality patents and the establishment of a new high quality court system (JRC, 
2016).  
An interesting evidence which may help shedding light on PAEs controversial role is in Cohen et al. 
(2014). The authors present a large-sample study based on the complete universe of PAEs litigation 
activity in the United States between 2000 and 2015; they find evidence that large assertion entities 
tend to behave opportunistically as they mainly sue firms that have substantial cash holdings. On the 
contrary, for small PAEs the cash holdings of the target firm are not a significant factor. The 
prevalence of opportunistic motives is confirmed by the fact that PAEs frequently forum shop (i.e. 
they look for the most favorable jurisdiction where to file the lawsuit) and that they tend to target 
firms against which they expect to have greater chances of winning the trial (the target firms are 
often involved in other litigation cases or have small legal teams). On similar lines, Hagiu and Yoffie 
(2013) observe that PAEs tend to sue target-companies at times when they are most vulnerable, 
“like just before the release of a new product, when the target can ill afford a risky trial”.  
Furthermore, by not being active in production, PAEs have the advantage that they do not risk to be 
counter-suited (de Bisthoven, 2013). 
An intensively debated issue regards the impact of PAEs on firms’ innovation and on technology 
diffusion. As highlighted in FTC (2016) and in JRC (2016), PAEs activity typically does not involve any 
technological transfer provided that patent license or litigation usually occur after the product at 
issue has already been developed or commercialized. This “ex-post” nature of PAEs transactions has 
raised concerns about their impact on innovation and economic growth (FTC, 2016 and JRC, 2016). A 
different perspective is taken in Cohen et al. (2014); the authors look at the impact of litigation 
against PAEs on the innovation activity of targeted firms. They find that losing against PAEs (either in 
Court or via a private settlement) significantly reduces firms’ R&D activities; compared to the 
behavior of similar companies not involved in litigations, the reduction is estimated to be around 
20%. Clearly, as the authors observe, for an overall evaluation of the consequences of PAEs litigation 
on innovation one should also consider that often assertion entities help small inventors to respond 
to infringement actions by large firms.  In this case, a fraction of the damages obtained by patent 
assertion entities may go back to the initial inventors thus increasing their earnings from innovation. 
However, the available estimates indicate that initial inventors obtain only a minor part of the 
damages cashed by PAEs (Bessen et al., 2012 and Bessen and Meurer, 2013). Bessen et al. (2012) 
estimate a very low pass-through: only five cents of every dollar in damages paid to a PAE goes to 
the benefit of the initial inventor. An interesting analysis is conducted by Kiebzak et al. (2016). The 
authors study the relationship between patent litigation and venture capital investment, a primary 
source of funding for entrepreneurial activity. They find interesting differences depending on 
whether litigation is brought by “frequent” litigators (a proxy for PAEs) or “regular” ones. Litigation 
initiated by PAEs has an unambiguously negative effect on venture capital funding while for regular 
patent litigators the authors find an inverted U-shaped relationship. 
8. Patents for software 
If the patent system raises several controversies, this is even the more so in the case of software, 
probably the most important ICT segment. Computer algorithms  are protected by copyright and 
originally they were not a patentable subject matter. In the early days of the computer industry, 
companies did not consider software as a product per se but they used to distribute it bundled with 
hardware. Since the late 70s, with the advent of personal computers, software development was 
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gradually separated from hardware production and companies, especially in the US, put growing 
pressure to consider software a patentable subject matter. After a series of courts decisions, in the 
US the patentability of computer programs has broadened; since the mid ‘90s software related-
inventions (often referred to as computer implemented inventions, CIIs) are treated as no different 
to inventions in any other technological field.11 This pro-software patent regime has led to an 
exponential growth in the number of patents granted by the USPTO. Nonetheless, some recent 
rulings are changing the scene and today, in the US, it is more difficult to obtain patent protection 
for software applications.12 In Europe, the EPC (European Patent Convention) excludes computer 
program claimed “as-such” from patentability. A computer program to be patentable needs to 
produce the so-called “technical effect”, that is solving a technical problem in a novel and non-
obvious manner (EPO, 2014). The European legal framework appears to be quite stable, without 
significant changes over the last years; at the same time, the recent rulings in the US have made the 
two approaches to software patentability more similar and today it cannot be concluded which one 
of the two systems is more open towards software patent eligibility (Strowel and Utku, 2016). 
The controversies about the role of patents in computer programming are related to the peculiar 
characteristics of software creation and distribution. Very often developers literally re-use lines of 
code from previous packages in order to create new applications; patent rights may potentially 
interfere with this common practice thus inhibiting innovation. This issue is even more relevant in 
relation to open source software where innovation is inherently based on open/free access to 
software code.  
A second important feature of software relates to the high level of abstraction characterizing the 
underlying technology (Bessen and Meurer, 2008). Software algorithms can be represented in 
several different ways; at the same time, two apparently different algorithms may turn out to be 
equivalent. Bessen and Meurer (2008) discuss the example of the “traveling-salesman” algorithm for 
routing delivery trucks; some time after its development, this algorithm was found to be equivalent 
to another one used to solve the map-colouring problem, a quite different purpose in practice. 
Abstraction of software technology makes it extremely difficult to know whether a given invention is 
truly different from previous ones. In this context, patent protection may be problematic as it might 
be difficult to ascertain whether a new software program is actually novel and non-obvious. 
Patents in software: some empirical evidence 
Estimating the actual number of software patents is a complex matter. Computer implemented 
inventions are embedded into technological systems potentially belonging to any industrial area; 
                                                             
11In the 1981 decision Diamond vs Diehr, the US Supreme Court established that an invention embedding a 
computer program could be patented. Software has been considered as any other invention since 1994 when 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that software running on general purpose computers is 
patentable (in re Alappat case).  
12In 2008, a landmark decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has established new guidelines 
for patent-eligibility (the Bilsky case). This decision has made it more difficult to obtain protection for some 
forms of applications, particularly those where computer implementation would be generally irrelevant, or at 
most incidental. More recently, in 2014, the US Supreme Court declared that a software package for 
facilitating financial transactions was ineligible for patent protection (Alice Corp. vs CLS Bank International 
case). This decision has increased uncertainty about the patentability of computer programs in the US to the 
extent that for some judges a broad interpretation of the decision might represent the death knell of software 
patents (see Zivojnovic, 2015). 
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therefore, in order to assess the magnitude of software patenting, researchers usually resort to 
keywords searches in the application documents. One of the first attempts to estimate the extent of 
software patenting is in Bessen and Hunt (2007). Using information on the patents granted by the 
USPTO, they find that the share of software patents spectacularly increased from 1.1% in 1976 to 
14.9% in 2002. Poo-Caamaño and German (2015) extend the study by Bessen and Hunt to more 
recent data and estimate that the share of software patents granted in the US soared to a noticeable 
36.4% in 2014. 
As regards Europe, Frietsch et al. (2015) look at patent applications filed at the EPO from 2000 to 
2010. By running keywords searches in the title, abstract and claims of each filing, the authors 
estimate that since 2002, more than 35% of all applications at the EPO are CIIs. They find that the 
majority of software filings are applied for by US and Japanese companies, followed by companies 
from Germany, France and Korea. Looking at the number of filings by industrial area, the authors 
notice that computer program filings are not limited to the software industry; about 78% of 
applications in Europe are filed within the manufacturing sectors, particularly in "Manufacture of 
computer, electronic and optical products", followed by "Machinery and equipment" and "Electrical 
equipments". This is a further evidence that computer program patents play a major role outside the 
software industry.13 Frietsch et al. (2015) also observe that, in Europe, the share of patents applied 
for by SMEs is smaller in software than in other industrial sectors. However, the authors show that 
the share of software patents belonging to SMEs is larger in Europe than in the United States. This 
latter finding is in line with previous evidence and shows that in the US the patenting activity in the 
software industry is concentrated in the hands of large companies (Bessen, 2012). 
The growth in software patenting has attracted the attention of several scholars. An interesting 
stream of research has investigated the value of software patents. Hall and MacGarvie (2010) 
employ an unbalanced panel of more than one thousand publicly traded US firms to estimate the 
private value of CII patents; their analysis covers a very broad period (from 1975 to 2002) and this 
allows the authors to control for the effects of the expansion of software patentability following 
different important Court decisions. They find evidence that rulings broadening software 
patentability had an immediate and negative, although moderate, impact on the stock market 
values of software producers; this effect was especially concentrated in firms with little experience 
in patenting. In a longer-run perspective, Hall and MacGarvie (2010) find that market value of firms 
holding large stocks of patents is higher than that of companies without software patents. However, 
marginal applications (i.e. applications not contributing significantly to the total stock of citations 
received by a company) seem not to impact on market value. Noel and Schankerman (2013) present 
a similar analysis; they look at the impact of strategic patents in software on firms’ market value. 
Patents are found to be valuable for firms as they generate large premiums in stock market 
performance. At the same time, Noel and Schankerman (2013) show that fragmentation increases 
R&D and patenting by firms but it lowers their market value.   
Software patents quality 
                                                             
13 Rentocchini (2011) obtains similar results in terms of nationality (mostly American and Japanese firms) and 
sectors to which the applicants belong to (mostly sectors different from software publishing). He also provides 
evidence that software firms do not consider patents an effective appropriability mechanism; rather patents 
are mainly filed for strategic motives. 
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One of the main concerns with patents in ICT in general and with software patents in particular is 
the quality of granted rights. A decline in patent quality increases transaction and litigation costs, 
thus endangering the functioning of the patent system as a whole. A series of studies has been 
conducted in the US; with few exceptions (Allison and Mann, 2007 and Graham and Vishnubhakat, 
2013) there is a general consensus regarding a lower quality of software patents compared to non-
software ones. Miller (2012) measures quality by looking at the validity of patent claims. The author 
collects information on patent lawsuits filed in the US from 2000 to 2006 and shows that software 
and business methods patents, which are typically software patents as well, are more likely to have 
invalid claims.14 On similar lines, in a more recent paper, Miller (2014) shows that in the period 2002-
2012, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has reversed the decision of the District Court 
judges on software patents much more frequently than for other patents, 40% compared to 24% of 
the times (similar findings are in Bessen and Meurer, 2008). 
Miller and Tabarrok (2014) argue that the lower quality of software patents is due to a too broad 
application of the so-called “means-plus function” claiming; the US patent law allows claims 
specifying the final purpose of an invention (functional claims) provided that they are limited by a 
specific means. When applied to computer programs, functional claiming has been too loosely 
applied ending-up in specifying very generic means such as “a computer” or a “data processing 
system”. This interpretation of US courts imposes very little limits to functional claims in software 
patents. Bessen (2014) supports the view that the low quality of software patents is related to the 
high level of abstraction of computer programs which, as discussed above, makes it more difficult for 
examiners to ascertain whether a technology is truly different from existing ones. According to 
Bessen, in the presence of abstract technologies it is almost inevitable for patent offices to issue 
patents with invalid claims or with ill-defined or “fuzzy” boundaries regarding the scope of 
protection. In addition to these arguments, Cockburn and MacGarvie (2009) observe that the lack of 
experience of US examiners in the new subject matters, such as software, has reduced their ability 
of searching the prior art, thus increasing uncertainty about the validity of granted patents.  
Smartphone wars 
Since 2007, the largest manufacturers of smartphones and other electronic devices started suing 
and counter-suing each other, claiming infringements of several patents and designs. The amount of 
legal actions reached unprecedented levels; in less than seven years, the top ten producers totalized 
more than 1,100 patent lawsuits worldwide (Yang, 2014). This wave of lawsuits, which has 
significantly influenced the competitive landscape of the smartphone market, is known as the 
“smartphone war” and it represents a clear example of the possible consequences of the strategic 
use of patents that we have documented in Section 2. It is widely believed that the root cause of this 
surge in litigation lies in the poor quality of software patents. This view is not shared by everybody, 
though; this is the case of Graham and Vishnubhakat (2013). The two authors focus on a series of 
high-profile lawsuits involving four of the major industry players, namely Apple, Microsoft, Motorola 
and Samsung. They find that 65 of the 73 asserted patents contained at least one software-related 
claim. Of the 21 software patents that, at the time their paper was drafted, had already been 
examined by some US federal district Courts, only 4 were found to be invalid or likely invalid. 
                                                             
14These stances are confirmed in GAO (2013) that finds that in the period 2007-2011 nearly half of the US 
patent lawsuits were software-related. 
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According to Graham and Vishnubhakat, the fact that about 80% of the asserted software patents 
(17 out of 21) were, instead, declared valid (or likely to be so) by Courts is a clear evidence of their 
quality.  
These arguments have been criticized in Miller and Tabarrok (2014). First of all, they argue that 4 out 
of 21 is far from being an acceptable proportion of invalid patents. This is even the more so if one 
considers that the ones being asserted are likely to be of higher quality than the average software 
patents; as a matter of fact, in smartphone wars litigants are large and established ICT practicing 
companies which are likely to hold valuable patents and litigate only when benefits are expected to 
be larger than costs.  
Teece et al. (2014) hold a more nuanced view. They do not deny the role of low quality patents in 
spurring litigation. However, they see smartphone wars being a corollary of the technological 
complexity characterizing ICTs; higher patent litigation reflects the high degree of competition and 
the large business opportunities in the market. Moreover, Teece et al. (2014) argue that patent wars 
can also be attributed to the not self-enforcing nature of IP rights. As a matter of fact, competitors 
can use protected technologies without permission and therefore for patentees litigation (or the 
threat of litigation) is the only way to enforce their rights. 
Software patents and Open Source Software 
In the recent years, open source software (OSS) has made inroads into several segments of the 
industry thus proving to be an extremely dynamic and innovative way of creating and distributing 
computer programs. In contrast with proprietary software, in OSS the source code is made available 
for using, reading, changing it or developing further versions of the program. The aim of these 
provisions, generally referred to as “copyleft”, is to keep the software source code open, thus 
promoting access, diffusion and collaborative development of programs. 
The surge in patenting has raised concerns on the coexistence between OSS and proprietary 
software; more specifically, software patents may clash with the distributed and incremental 
approach to innovation typical of OSS. Since the well-known SCO-Linux controversy in 2003, a series 
of legal disputes have been involving OSS developers and users; for example, in 2011, Lodsys LLC, a 
very active PAE in the software market,  sent letters to a number of small open source mobile 
application developers claiming that they were infringing on its patents. For this reason the OSS 
community started adopting defensive strategies against unwarranted assertion of patents (for 
details, see Burns, 2013). One of such strategies is the creation of defensive patent pools. The most 
prominent example is Open Invention Network (OIN) which was launched in 2005 with the mission 
to protect Linux. This defensive patent pool is backed by some major ICT players such as Google, 
IBM, Philips, Red Hat, Sony, NEC, Novel and dozens of other large and small organizations. OIN owns 
around three hundred patents which are made available free of charge to any company or individual 
that agrees not to assert its patent against the Linux system (see Burns, 2013).  
The literature has highlighted that litigation, or the threat of possible litigation, may have important 
consequences for OSS. Specifically, Wen et al. (2013) examine the impact of patent enforcement 
targeting OSS on the success of open source projects. Using a difference-in-difference approach, the 
authors find that projects with a high degree of overlap with the litigated OSS suffer a larger decline 
in user interest (about 15%) and lower developer activity (about 45%) with respect to the control 
group. The decline in interest of the open source community is found to be stronger for business 
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projects specific to the disputed OSS platform (34% greater decline in user interest and 86% less 
developer activity compared to the control group). Another interesting analysis about the interplay 
between software patents and OSS is conducted in Wen et al. (2015). The authors study the impact 
of the 2005 IBM decision of non assertion of patents against the OSS community and the creation of 
a patent common, a set of patents made available royalty-free to the community. The study shows 
how this “collaborative” usage of patents has increased OSS start-up entry. Wen et al. (2015) also 
find that the IBM decision had larger impact in the segments of the market where innovation was 
highly cumulative. 
9. Concluding remarks 
The literature on the role of patent protection in information and communication technologies has 
developed greatly in the last decades, in parallel with the growing importance of the ICT sectors. 
One of the features which has raised major concerns is the recent surge in patenting and the 
associated high degree of fragmentation of IP rights. Fragmentation of the scope of patenting comes 
hand in hand with a series of potentially problematic consequences such as patent thickets, royalty 
stacking, augmented patent litigation as well as difficulties in the definition of licensing terms for 
patents related to standardized technologies. The surge in patents has boosted the workload of 
patent offices, it has increased the risk of low quality patents as well as the uncertainty on 
technology markets. 
To a certain extent, patent proliferation can be considered as a “natural” phenomena due to specific 
factors characterizing ICT sectors – i.e. the cumulativeness of the innovation process and the high 
degree of technological complexity. In recent years, these phenomena have become even more 
striking due to the evolving role of patents and their use as a strategic instrument and as a tool to 
collect royalties. 
In this paper, we have reviewed the rich literature analysing the multifaceted role of patents in 
information and communication technologies. Our approach has been to blend academic and more 
policy oriented views in order to provide a comprehensive picture of the various issues at stake.  
Several contributions in the literature have studied the different institutional solutions that have 
been adopted to deal with IP fragmentation. Patent pools represent a one-stop-shop easing access 
to the relevant technologies to implementers. SSOs are aiming at coordinating efforts for a smooth 
development of interoperable standards. Both pools and SSOs require cooperation among patent 
holders and industry participants and despite their role as facilitators of technology transfer, they 
raise concerns in two directions; first of all, as forms of horizontal agreements, they may conceal 
anti-competitive purposes. On top of this, they have been criticized for not defining a clear way of 
determining the licensing terms. SSOs members typically commit to license their patents on fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms in the attempt to moderate the market power of 
standard essential patents. However, FRAND commitments only define a general framework for the 
determination of the licensing terms and leave the identification of the exact conditions to 
negotiations between patent holders and implementers. As such, the definition of FRAND licensing 
rates remains a challenging and controversial process. In principle, patent market intermediaries – 
aggregators and patent assertion entities – are expected to increase market thickness, favour patent 
transactions and help smoothing out distortions. Nonetheless, also in this case the practical 
experience not always follows expectations; in particular, a strong controversy has developed on the 
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role of patent assertion entities, often considered among the main responsible for the surge in 
patent litigation. PAEs are a quite novel market player; they were born essentially as an ICT 
phenomenon but today they are spreading their activities towards other high-tech sectors, 
particularly in life sciences industries. Further investigation on the role of PAEs, on their effects and 
consequences is highly desirable.  
The controversies related with the surge in patenting are even more relevant in the case of 
software, probably the most important ICT segment. Software products are based on abstract 
computer algorithms where patenting criteria do not directly apply. Protection of computer 
implemented inventions is a complex matter and Europe and the US have followed different routes 
regarding software patentability, with this latter country adopting a more pro-patent approach; 
nonetheless, recent courts rulings have changed the scene and today, in the US, it has become more 
difficult to obtain patent protection for software applications. In a world of increasing 
interoperability and at the verge of Internet of Things the protection mechanisms for software and 
related technologies will play an even more important role in the future.  
Looking forward, from our survey we can envisage several directions for further research. The 
theoretical literature on the role of patents in the presence of a cumulative innovation process is 
quite well developed. Nonetheless, much has been written on the risk of hold-up while very few 
contributions look at the hold-out problem, that is the practice of implementers who often infringe 
patents and resist patent owner demands because the odds of getting caught are small. Despite its 
practical relevance, the hold-out problem has been surprisingly undertheorized. On top of this, due 
to the difficulty in measuring the innovation cumulativeness, only few studies analyze empirically 
the role of patents in stimulating R&D in ICTs. As a consequence many theoretical predictions are 
still to be validated empirically and further research in this field is highly recommendable. The 
prospect of the establishment of a unitary patent system and the associated activation of a unitary 
patent court in Europe is also opening promising lines of research. Once implemented, the new 
regime will represent a genuine game changer, with potentially relevant consequences on firms’ 
patenting strategies. One of the most intriguing open questions regards its effects on PAEs activities. 
In relation to patents protecting software technologies, we foresee at least two very promising areas 
of research. The first one relates to the interplay between open source and patented software. As 
mentioned, OSS and proprietary software are two alternative ways to create and distribute software 
programs; the point is that their coexistence is often problematic and it is still very much unclear 
how to encourage an efficient interplay between them. The other promising area of research 
regards the role of patents in mobile applications. This market has developed very recently and 
today is one of the most dynamic and innovative segment in the software industry. So far, 
developers do not seem to have made much use of patents. Nonetheless things are changing also in 
this respect and a full understanding of the role of patents protecting mobile applications is highly 
desirable. 
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